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To BE OR NOT TO BE A "NEW RULE:" THE
NoN-RETROACTiviTY OF NEWLY RECOGNIZED
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AFTER CONvIcTION
MARSHALL J. HARTMAN*
Consider the reaction of the average member of the lay public to the
following scenario taking place in a physician's office: a patient is diagnosed
as having a fatal disease and given six months to live. Thereafter, within
four months the New England Journal of Medicine reveals that a cure has
been found for this terminal illness. Upon application to the doctor for the
"new cure" which would save his life, the patient is told that it is unavailable
to him, because under existing medical guidelines, the patient may be treated
only by the medicine and procedures available to him at the date of
diagnosis. Would such a revelation not be shocking to the public at large?
Yet, it is precisely this kind of pronouncement that the legal profession now
faces.
Ever since the United States Supreme Court handed down its rulings in
Teague v. Lane1 and Penry v. Lynaugh,2 the question of which court
decisions should apply retroactively has been a continuing source of debate
in both state and federal forums; especially in dealing with cases on collateral
review. In Teague, the United States Supreme Court held that the decision
as to whether the "rule" of a case should be given retrospective application
turned upon whether it was a "new rule." If it was, that "rule" would not
apply retroactively to any case on collateral review. If, however, the "rule"
announced in the decision was not a "new rule," then it would be applied
retroactively to all cases on collateral review. Penry applied the Teague
doctrine to capital cases as well.
With respect to cases on direct review, in Teague, the Supreme Court
noted that it had already held in 1987 that where the defendant's conviction
was not yet final, all subsequent Supreme Court decisions were retroactive,
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on the article.
1. 489 U.S. 288 (1989), reh'g denied, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989).
2. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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including those which enunciated "new rules."3 Thus, the question that
remained to be resolved in determining which constitutional decisions were
to be given retrospective application in cases on collateral review was simply,
what constituted a "new rule."
The answer to this question has been elusive at best, and subject to
differing interpretations, even among the Justices of the Supreme Court. In
Taylor v. Gilmore,4 however, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
attempted to provide specific criteria for determining what does and what
does not constitute a "new rule." In so doing, the opinion, authored by
Judge Joel Flaum, has made a significant contribution to the emerging
jurisprudence of retroactivity in federal habeas corpus cases.
Sections one through five of this article discuss the origin of the "new
rule" concept and the difficulty of its application. Section six explores the
nature of the criteria comprising Judge Flaum's formula for determining
whether or not a decision constitutes a "new rule" for purposes of retroactive
application in federal habeas corpus cases. Sections seven and eight analyze
and apply Judge Flaum's criteria to recent federal and Supreme Court
decisions. Finally, a brief critique of the "new rule" doctrine as it applies
to death penalty cases concludes this article.
I. THE ORIGIN OF THE NEW RULE CONCEPT
Prior to Teague and Penry, the question of when a decision should be
given retroactive application had already been the subject of much dispute in
the Courts.5 There was dissatisfaction with the unequal treatment afforded
defendants under prior existing law.6 Although at common law all prece-
3. 489 U.S. at 304. The Court had held in Griffith v. Kentucky, that decisions announcing
new constitutional rules of criminal procedure "are to be applied retroactively to all cases, state
or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final." 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987). Finality in
a criminal conviction occurs when a decision is rendered by the United States Supreme Court,
or certiorari denied on direct review, or the time within which to file a petition for writ of
certiorari has expired. Id. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 314.
4. 954 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1992) cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
5. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969), reh'g denied 395 U.S. 931
(1969); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
6. See, e.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), reh'g denied 385 U.S. 890
(1966). Johnson was handed down one week after the Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). As in Miranda, Johnson did not receive any warnings concerning his
Constitutional rights, and as a result his confession was introduced against him. Although
Miranda was spared, Johnson's conviction and sentence of death were upheld under the
retroactivity rules then extant. Those rules did not allow retroactive application of decisions
whose main effect was to discipline the police. Under the retroactivity rules laid down by
Teague and its progeny, Johnson would have obtained relief since his case was still on direct
review. See also Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), where the Court stated that the "new"
constitutional rule it announced in that case would be applied prospectively only, but then
allowed an exception for the particular litigant in whose case the rule had been announced. In
Stovall, the test for retroactivity was formulated as a function of three considerations: "a) the
purpose to be served by the new standards, b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards, and c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive
application of the new standards." Id. at 297. These cases were criticized by Justice Harlan
2
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dents were retroactive,7 just prior to Teague, existing precedent differentiat-
ed between rules aimed primarily at deterring police conduct and those
designed to promote the accuracy of criminal proceedings. The former rules
were held not to apply retroactively, while the latter rules were held to be
retroactive.8
In addition, the approach of Justice Harlan, which had been expressed
in prior concurring and dissenting opinions as early as 1969, 9 had begun to
gain support. Justice Harlan had advocated simply allowing retrospective
application of Supreme Court decisions to all cases on direct appeal, and
denying retrospective application of those decisions which promulgated new
constitutional rules to cases on collateral review, with two stated excep-
tions. 10 The first exception was for "substantive due process rules" which
place as a matter of constitutional interpretation, certain primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law making authority
to proscribe." The second exception was for bedrock procedural issues
which "are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 2 In his view, this
approach furthered the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus, i.e., to insure
that state prisoners were not denied federal constitutional rights, existing at
the time of their convictions. 3 At the same time, Harlan's approach did
not impose upon the police a higher standard of law in dealing with a
defendant than the law existing at the time the defendant's conviction became
final. 4
Prior to Teague, in Yates v. Aiken 5 the Supreme Court had already
indicated that it was considering the Harlan approach to retroactivity. In
Yates, the defendant and an accomplice robbed a store in South Carolina. 6
After the defendant left, both his accomplice and the storekeeper's wife were
in Desist, 394 U.S. at 257, 258.
7. The reason that all decisions were applied retroactively under English Common Law was
the Blackstonian belief that there was a true natural law, and "that the law should be taken to
have always been what it is said to mean at a later date." Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S.
667, 677 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). In other words, judges merely
discovered the law, as opposed to creating it. Therefore, once a Judge "discovered" the proper
applicable law with respect to a case, naturally it would be retroactive. It was not until the legal
positivists introduced the notion that "law" was a creation of man, and was determined by what
was written in the law books at any given time, that the question of whether a law should be
given retroactive application became areal issue. See Linidetter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623-
25(1965).
8. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
9. See, e.g., Desist, 394 U.S. at 258-69 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Mackey v. United States,
401 U.S. 667, 675-702 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
10. See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 681, 689.
11. Id. at 692.
12. Id. at 693 (quoting Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
13. Id. at 686.
14. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263 (1969).
15. 484 U.S. 211 (1988).
16. Id. at 212.
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killed.17 After the trial court instructed the jury to presume malice fr-om the
use of a deadly weapon, he was convicted and sentenced to death" The
South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the decision in 1982.19
Thereafter, on petition for habeas corpus to the state Supreme Court,'
the defendant argued that this instruction was contrary to South Carolina law,
as determined by subsequent state decisions, and contrary to the prior 1979
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Sandstrom v. Montana,2
and its later 1985 decision in Francis v. Franklin.' These decisions held
that such presumptions impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the
defendant with respect to an element of the offense. 3 The state supreme
court denied the defendant's writ of habeas corpus, and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.'
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. He noted
first that the South Carolina Attorney General had suggested that the United
States Supreme Court adopt the Harlan approach to retroactivity?1 Justice
Stevens pointed out that the Court had already adopted the first part of the
Harlan approach, i.e., with respect to cases on direct appeal, Supreme Court
rulings had already been held retroactive.' Justice Stevens then noted that
the Court did not need to reach the question of the second part of the Harlan
approach, i.e., whether "new constitutional rules" should apply to cases on
collateral review, in order to decide the case at barY As Harlan had ex-
plained, some decisions, those based clearly on prior constitutional prece-
dents, would not announce a "new rule."' The decisions in those cases,
therefore, should apply to all subsequent cases, even those on collateral
review.29
Justice Stevens then held that the 1979 decision in Sandstrom controlled
in Yates.' Because that decision predated the affirmance of the defendant's
conviction in 1982, there was no question of it being a "new rule."
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. (citing State v. Yates, 310 S.E.2d 805 (S.C. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1124
(1983).
20. Id.
21. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
22. 471 U.S. 307 (1985).
23. Francis, 471 U.S. at 317-18; Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523-24.
24. Yates, 484 U.S. at 213-14.
25. Id. at 215.
26. Id. (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987) (holding that Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), applies retroactively to all cases pending on direct appeal)).
27. Yates, 484 U.S. at 215-16.
28. Id. at 216 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263-64 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
29. Id. at 216-17.
30. Id.
PMe. 29
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Therefore, the Court reversed and remanded Yates" because it was dictated
by prior precedent.
Thereafter, on February 22, 1989 in Teague v. Lane, the Supreme Court
issued what appeared to be a clear new principle of retroactivity concerning
issues raised on collateral review. The Teague principle provided, as a
general rule, that no "new constitutional rules" would be applied or
announced in cases on collateral review.32
II. DEFINrrIONS OF A "NEW RULE"
Accepting the "Harlan" approach turned out to be the easiest part of the
Supreme Court's effort to resolve the problem of retroactivity in a fair and
just manner. The real question of what constituted a "new rule" also
devolved upon the Court in Teague to resolve. On that issue, Justice
O'Connor, speaking for the majority, defined a "new rule" as one which
"breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the states or Federal
government."33 The Court further defined a rule as new, "if the result was
not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction
became final. "I The Court reserved two exceptions: the first for a retroac-
tive application of a "new rule" if it would decriminalize a class of conduct,
and the second for "bedrock procedural" rules35 "without which the likeli-
hood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished."'
Of course in Teague, there was no question but that had the petitioner
prevailed, a "new rule" would have been announced on collateral review.
There, the habeas petitioner questioned the retroactivity of the decision in
Batson v. Kentucky,37 relating to the abolition of discriminatory practices
in jury selection. Batson had expressly overruled the decision in Swain v.
Alabama.3"
31. Id. at 218.
32. 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).
33. Id. at 301.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 311 (quoting Justice Harlan's dissenting and concurring opinion in Mackey v. United
States, 401 U.S. 667, 693-94 (1971)).
36. Id. at 313. The next year, in Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990), Justice Kennedy
would characterize the "bedrock procedural" rule exception as applying only to "watershed"
decisions, such as the right to counsel guaranteed in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
37. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Batson, the Court held that it was a denial of the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws for a prosecutor to dismiss prospective
jurors, even on peremptory challenge, if the sole reason for the dismissal was due to race. Id.
at 84-89.
38. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). In Swain, which was overruled by Batson, the Court had ruled that
in order to prove a Constitutional violation, it was the defendant's burden to show a systematic
pattern of exclusion of blacks from the jury by the prosecution. As a practical matter, it was
a burden almost impossible to prove by an individual defendant, as it involved examining the
prosecution's modus operandi in a number of cases in order to show that the exclusion due to
race in a particular case was not a isolated instance.
5
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Then in Penry v. Lynaugh,39 the Court held that granting Penry's
petition for writ of federal habeas corpus would not constitute the announce-
ment of a "new rule." Penry requested a rule that, when mitigating evidence
such as that of mental retardation was offered, jury instructions must be
given which would allow the jury to give effect to that mitigating evidence
in determining whether the defendant should live or die.' Justice O'Con-
nor, speaking for a majority of the Court, held that the result in Penry was
dictated by the prior decisions of the Supreme Court in Lockett v. Ohio41
and Eddings v. Oklahoma,42 which had held that sentencing juries were
entitled to hear all possible mitigating evidence prior to making a capital
decision. 43
Based upon its application in Penry, the Teague rule seemed reasonable,
or at least tolerable, and there Was little hue or cry about the case.
Seemingly unnoticed was the fact that there were four dissenters as to
whether Penry announced a "new rule." Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, White,
and Kennedy would have held that Penry did announce a "new rule," and
relief would therefore have been barred under Teague." It was not until
the decision of the Court in Butler v. McKellar5 that the ramifications of
Teague hit home with a driving force to the majority of capital litigants on
habeas corpus review and their lawyers.'
III. APPLICATIONS OF TEAGUE
In order to understand why Butler brought home the implications of
Teague so dramatically, we must review the backdrop of cases that led up to
the Supreme Court's decision in Butler. These antecedent cases included a
trio of cases arising out of Arizona: Miranda v. Arizona,47 Edwards v.
Arizona," and Arizona v. Roberson.49
Miranda established the responsibility of law enforcement agents to
advise custodial suspects of their constitutional rights, including that of their
right to remain silent and to request counsel to enforce their Fifth Amend-
39. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
40. Id. at 312.
41. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
42. 455 U.S. 104 (1982)).
43. 492 U.S. at 318-19.
44. Id. at 350-52 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
45. 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
46. See generally Shelvin Singer & Marshall J. Hartman, Collateral Attack on State
Conviction: State Post-Conviction Hearing Act; State and Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings,
in ILIUNOIS INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, DEFENDING ILLINOIS CRIMINAL
CASES ch. 13S (1988, Supp. 1991).
47. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
48. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
49. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
[Vol. 29
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ment rights.:
In Edwards, the Court had upheld the suppression of a confession, where
police detectives had reinitiated questioning of a defendant about a series of
offenses, after the suspect had earlier expressed his desire not to talk to the
police without a lawyer present.5' The Court held that once an accused
asserted his request to deal with the police only through counsel, the police
were barred from further interrogation of the defendant until counsel had
been provided, unless the accused himself initiated further communication
with the police. 2
Thereafter, in Roberson, Arizona sought an exception to the Edwards
rule for the case where instead of two interrogations about the same offense,
there were two interrogations about separate and unrelated offenses. 3
Roberson had been arrested for a burglary. When he requested an attorney,
interrogation ceased, but three days later, another officer questioned
Roberson about a second unrelated burglary.'
Roberson had not consulted with counsel in the three day interval
between his request for an attorney on the original charge and the interroga-
tion on the second charge.55 The officer who questioned Roberson on the
second burglary was not aware that he had asked for an attorney at the initial
interrogation.56 Further, prior to questioning, this officer advised Roberson
of his Miranda rights, and this time Roberson waived his right to remain
silent. 7 The State used Roberson's statements against him at the trial for
the second burglary.5"
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court, holding that a request for
an attorney differed from a refusal to answer questions. 9 When he asks for
a lawyer, the defendant raises the presumption that he cannot proceed
through the criminal justice system without one.' Thereafter, the police
cannot even ask him to waive his right to be silent without a lawyer
present.61  However,when he merely declines to answer questions,the
suspect makes no such assertion.62 In that context, a subsequent waiver of
his Fifth Amendment rights may still arise, with or without the provision of
50. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
51. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 480.
52. Id. at 485.
53. 486 U.S. at 677.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 686.
56. Id. at 678.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 683.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 681.
62. Id. at 683.
7
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counsel."
Justice Stevens then held that because Roberson had requested counsel
before being questioned on the first burglary, his statements relating to the
second burglary were inadmissible as well.' There could be no exception
or deviation from Edwards merely because the questioning was on an
unrelated charge.' Justice Stevens concluded by noting that Edwards itself
was soundly grounded on principles espoused in Miranda v. Arizona.'
The Butler case involved two separate incidents. Pamela Lane, a store
clerk, was found dead near a pond in July 1980.67 Six weeks later, Butler
was arrested for assault and battery and, after invoking his Fifth Amendment
right to counsel, Butler retained counsel, who appeared in Bond Court with
him.' Butler, unable to make bail, was returned to the county jail after the
hearing.' The next morning he was taken to the police station and ques-
tioned about the murder of Pamela Lane.' After receiving Miranda
warnings, Butler confessed to the murder."1 This time he did not request
counsel at the police station.7
Butler was charged and convicted of first degree murder and sentenced
to death.' The jury concluded that Butler had committed the murder
during the course of a rape and was therefore eligible for the death
penalty. 74 The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the conviction, and
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1982.15
In May, 1986 Butler filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief.76
He questioned, "whether police had the right to initiate questioning about the
murder, knowing petitioner had retained an attorney for the assault
charge."' The federal district court denied Butler's petition, 8 and the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.79 The same day that
Butler's petition for rehearing in the circuit court was denied, the Supreme
63. Id.
64. Id. at 686.
65. Id. at 685.
66. Id. at 680.
67. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 409 (1982).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 409-10.
72. Id. at 409.
73. Id. at 410.
74. Id.
75. State v. Butler, 290 S.E.2d 1 (S.C. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 932 (1982).
76. Butler v. McKeller, 494 U.S. at 410.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Butler v. Aiken, 846 F.2d 255 (1988).
[Vol. 29
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Court handed down the decision in Roberson.'
Citing Roberson, Butler then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the
Supreme Court.8' Prior to Teague, Butler's writ of habeas corpus would
clearly have been granted on the basis of Roberson. Even after Teague, one
might have surmised that relief would not be denied by the Supreme Court
since a majority of the Roberson Court had held that the result in Roberson
was controlled by its prior decision in Edwards v. Arizona 2 This would
lead one to believe that Roberson had not announced a "new rule."
However, Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a majority,' comprised of
the dissenters in Penry plus Justice O'Connor, held in Butler that Roberson
had not been sufficiently dictated by Edwards to survive the Teague test."
Therefore Roberson had announced a "new rule," which was not available
for retroactive application to Butler on habeas corpus review.' The Court
therefore denied habeas corpus relief to Butler, over the vigorous dissents of
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.86
This, then, was the legacy of Teague as interpreted by the Chief Justice
in Butler. So restrictive was this interpretation that, in the words of Justice
Brennan, it effectively barred relief to any state prisoner unless he or she
could show "that the state court's rejection of the constitutional challenge was
so clearly invalid under then-prevailing legal standards that the decision could
not be defended by any reasonable jurist. With this requirement, the Court
finally succeeded in its thinly veiled crusade to eviscerate Congress' habeas
corpus regime. " '
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan further pointed out that under
Chief Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of Butler, "a legal ruling sought by
a federal habeas petitioner is now deemed 'new' as long as the correctness
of the rule, based on precedent existing when the petitioner's conviction
became final, is 'susceptible to debate among reasonable minds.'" 88 Justice
Brennan summarized the Court's ruling by noting that, "under the guise of
fine-tuning the definition of 'new rule,' the Court strips state prisoners of
virtually any meaningful federal review of the constitutionality of their
incarceration.""
80. Butler v. McKeller, 494 U.S. at 412.
81. Id.
82. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1988).
83. This majority was comprised of the dissenters in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989),
plus Justice O'Connor.
84. Butler, 494 U.S. at 414-15.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 417.
87. Id. at 417-18 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
88. Id. (quoting the majority opinion, 494 U.S. at 415).
89. 494 U.S. at 417 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9
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IV. RETROACTIVITY BECOMES A THRESHOLD QUESTION
Another application of the "new rule" doctrine which denied retroactivity
occurred in Saffle v. Parks,9' decided shortly after Butler. In Parks, a gas
station attendant was found shot to death in his station in Oklahoma City.9"
Parks was charged and convicted of capital murder.' At the sentencing
hearing, the defense argued that Parks' youth, race, and broken home were
mitigating factors that the jury should consider.' The trial judge then
instructed the jury they "must avoid any influence of sympathy, sentiment,
passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor when imposing sentence."'
The jury sentenced Parks to death.95
His conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal,' and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1983.1 Thereafter, Parks filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that by this "antisympathy
instruction" the trial judge had in effect told the jury to disregard the
mitigation that Parks had presented at the sentencing hearing.9" Sitting en
banc, the Court of Appeals reversed the denial of the writ by the District
Court, holding that the instruction violated the Eighth Amendment for the
reasons advanced by Parks.' This time the Supreme Court granted certiorari
and reversed the Court of Appeals.' °°
Justice Kennedy, speaking for the same five person majority that decided
Butler,'0' began his analysis by noting that Parks' case was on collateral
review."° The first question, therefore, was "whether the relief sought
would create a new rule under . . . [Teague] and [Penry]. " ' Justice
90. Saffile v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990).
91. Id. at 486.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 487.
95. Id.
96. Parks v. State, 651 P.2d 686 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983).
97. Parks v. Oklahoma, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983).
98. Parks relied on the earlier decisions of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) and Eddings
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 105 (1982). See infra notes 108 and 109. These cases stood for the
proposition that the jury was entitled to hear all relevant mitigating evidence. He also relied on
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 535, 545 (1987). Brown, decided after Parks' conviction became
final, approved an instruction telling the jury not to be swayed by "mere sentiment, conjecture,
sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." Brown, 479 U.S. at 539.
However, this was interpreted as applying to sentiment not based upon the evidence. Parks
argued that the corollary to Brown was that such an instruction could not be given to preclude
jurors from utilizing sympathy or sentiment based upon mitigating evidence. Saffle v. Parks, 494
U.S. at 494.
99. Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir. 1988).
100. 490 U.S. 1034 (1989).
101. See supra notes 67-90 and accompanying text. The majority Justices in both Butler and
Parks were Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy.
102. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. at 487.
103. Id.
10
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Kennedy then observed that when the Court explicitly overruled a prior
precedent, clearly a new rule was created."°4 But the more difficult
question raised in Butler was whether, even in the case of a decision which
was dictated by prior precedent, the Court "announce[s] a new rule when a
decision extends the reasoning of [its] prior cases."s Since the goal of
habeas corpus was to insure that state court procedure comported with
interpretations of the Constitution at the time of petitioner's conviction,
Justice Kennedy's test was to determine whether precedent existing at the
time petitioner's conviction became final would have "compelled" the state
court to conclude that the rule sought was required by the Constitution. If
not, then the decision constituted a "new rule."" °  Under this reasoning,
a state court decision would withstand a habeas corpus attack even if it was
shown to be contrary to later decisions. This would occur, so long as when
made, the state court decision was a reasonable interpretation of existing
precedents.
Kennedy then concluded that the rule sought by Parks was not dictated
by prior decisions in cases such as Lockett v. Ohio"7 and Eddings v.
Oklahoma, °'0 which had held that the State cannot bar relevant mitigating
evidence from being considered by the jury. But they did not deal with
"how it must consider the mitigating evidence."' 9 Therefore, the rule
Parks sought would have been a new rule, of which retroactive application
to him was prohibited by Teague and Butler.1" Consequently, Justice
Kennedy never reached the question of whether the action of the trial court
in giving the "antisympathy instruction" violated Parks' constitutional rights.
Thus "retroactivity" had become a threshold question, and the merits of a
case would never be reached in the future unless it was determined that
retroactive relief was not barred by a "new rule."
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,
dissented."' He began his analysis by observing that the Court "displays
undue eagerness to apply the new standard for retroactivity announced in
104. Id. at 488.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), a plurality of the Court decided that an Ohio
death penalty statute that limited the jury's consideration to specified mitigating circumstances
violated the constitutional requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases. It held that
the sentencer not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record or any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Id. at 604.
108. In Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), the Court ruled that a sentencing judge
may not refuse to consider mitigating evidence presented by a capital defendant concerning his
family history and troubled childhood.
109. Parks, 494 U.S. at 490.
110. Id. at 494.
111. Id. at 495.
11
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Butler, at the expense of thoughtful legal analysis."11 Justice Brennan then
pointed out that what was at issue in Parks was the possibility that the "anti-
sympathy" instruction prevented the jury, or at least some of them, from
considering Parks' mitigation evidence."' To that extent, he argued, that
result would be prohibited by Eddings and Lockett, which held that "a
sentencer may 'not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor,
any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances
of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death.'" 11 4 It is significant to note here that the four dissenting justices of the
Supreme Court were in agreement with the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, which had held that the result in Parks was dictated by Eddings and
Lockett.
Justice Brennan also noted the similarity to the question in Pen., i.e.
whether Lockett and Eddings dictated the result, when there was a question
of a jury not being able to utilize mitigating information in an effective
manner. 15 Justice Brennan then pointed out that the result in Parks was
also contrary to that reached by the Supreme Court in Penry.1 6 However,
that is interesting, because the dissenters in Penry became the majority of the
Court in Parks, with the addition of Justice O'Connor, who had written the
majority opinion in Penry.
Finally, Justice Brennan noted that even if Parks would announce a new
rule by outlawing this "anti-sympathy instruction," it should fall under the
second exception to the retroactivity rule enunciated in Teague, which related
to "bedrock procedural" issues. 7 He would not limit this exception to
"watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness
and accuracy of the criminal proceeding""' as the majority would. His
view was that individualized sentencing in a life or death situation was of
sufficient importance to invoke the retroactivity of Teague's stated excep-
tions.' 19
V. THE WORST OF BOTH POSSIBLE WORLDS
Sawyer v. Smith" reinforced the definition of a "new rule," as
interpreted by Butler v. McKellar."' In Sawyer, the Court denied relief
112. Id. at 496.
113. Id. at 498-99.
114. Id. at 501 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); and citing Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982)).
115. Id. at 502.
116. Id. at 503.
117. Id. at 505.
118. Id. (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989))).
119. Id. at 505-06.
120. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
121. See supra notes 67-89 and accompanying text.
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to a habeas petitioner whose murder conviction and sentence of death
became final prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Caldwell v. Mississippi." The Court employed the "new rule doctrine to
bar federal habeas corpus relief to Sawyer where he had apparently failed to
raise the Caldwell issue on direct review."z  However, in another case
decided in 1989, in which a habeas petitioner failed to raise the identical
Caldwell issue, the Court barred relief on the grounds of waiver, i.e. that the
issue was not novel enough to justify not having been raised by the petitioner
in his direct appeal in the state courtY1'
In Sawyer, petitioner and a co-defendant were convicted of killing a
female visitor who resided in his house. The killing was brutal, as it involved
stripping the victim, beating her, dousing her with lighter fluid, and finally
setting her afire.' s The prosecutor told the jury in closing argument that
a sentence of death would be "merely a recommendation," and that others
would be able to correct it if it turned out to be wrong." Actually, this
statement was a misstatement of the law, since review by the Louisiana
Supreme Court was limited to the question of whether the sentence was
excessive."z More importantly, it shifted the jury's sense of responsibility
to a higher authority." The jury sentenced the defendant to death,"w
and his conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Louisiana Supreme
Court."3 After various petitions were granted and denied, petitioner filed
a writ of federal habeas corpus, citing Caldwell, which was handed down one
year after Sawyer's conviction became final."
In Caldwell, the prosecutor had informed the jury during closing
argument that they need not worry if they imposed the death penalty on the
defendant, since the state Supreme Court would review the sentence
automatically on appeal. 32 The United States Supreme Court held that
such a statement, attempting to shift responsibility for the decision, was
inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment's heightened need for reliability in
the determination that death was the appropriate punishment for a specific
defendant.133 The Court then vacated Caldwell's sentence of death."M
122. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
123. See Louisiana v. Sawyer, 422 So. 2d 95 (La. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S.
1223 (1983). Although the Louisiana Supreme Court did consider certain statements made by
the prosecutor in the sentencing hearing, those statements did not involve the reversibility of the
death sentence. Id. at 104-05.
124. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401 (1989).
125. Id. at 230-32.
126. Id. at 245 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. See id.
128. Id. at 232.
129. Id. at 230.
130. Id. at 232.
131. Id.
132. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 325-26.
133. Id. at 341.
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Sawyer argued in his petition for federal habeas corpus that Caldwell
required reversal of his death sentence, because the same attempt to shift
responsibility for the jury's decision was made in his case as well. 135 The
Supreme Court's majority opinion in Sawyer, written by Justice Kennedy,
and joined in by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, O'Connor, and
Scalia denied federal habeas relief, citing Teague v. Lane.1" Justice
Kennedy noted first that in Teague, the Court had held that a "new rule" of
constitutional law established after a petitioner's conviction had become final
could not be used to attack the conviction on federal habeas corpus, unless
the rule fell into one of two narrow exceptions.13 Kennedy then went on
to hold that Caldwell had announced such a new rule, and therefore
retroactive relief was barred to Sawyer because he failed to qualify for either
exception.13
The dissent authored by Justice Marshall, and joined in by Justices
Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens argued that Caldwell did not announce a
"new rule" of constitutional law. The dissent began its analysis by pointing
out that even under the Teague-Butler standard, if the answer to a legal
question was not susceptible to debate among legal minds, or if existing
precedent would have compelled state courts to provide relief at the time the
defendant's conviction became final, the decision would not announce a "new
rule."139 In the case of Caldwell, the shifting of the burden from the jury
to some higher authority tainted the entire decision making process of thejury, and was central to the reliability of the procedure."4 A number of
earlier Supreme Court decisions had emphasized the importance of the
sentencer confronting the "truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death
for a fellow human.. .with due regard for the consequences of their deci-
sion.""' Justice Marshall then noted that by the time of Caldwell, it was
"a given that capital sentencers would view their task as the serious one of
determining whether a specific human being should die at the hands of the
state." 42 Thus Caldwell was virtually "dictated" by prior precedent, and
therefore did not announce a "new rule" within the meaning of Teague v.
Lane, and its progeny.143
The dissent also tried to get around Teague's retroactivity bar by fitting
Sawyer's case into one of the narrow exceptions noted by Teague. Even
134. Id.
135. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 232.
136. Id. at 234.
137. Id. at 241. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (discussing Teague and
exceptions).
138. Id. at 245.
139. Id. at 24647.
140. Id. at 247-88.
141. See id at 247 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 598 (1978)).
142. Id. at 247 (quoting Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 329).
143. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 247 (quoting Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 329).
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under the Teague-Butler formulation, if it were a rule "without which the
likelihood of an accurate [verdict] is seriously diminished," 1" that rule
would be available on federal habeas corpus. Justice Marshall noted that such
an approach was consistent with the prior rules of retroactivity which had
always recognized the difference between rules primarily aimed at deterring
police conduct and those designed to promote the accuracy of criminal
proceedings.145
The dissent argued that telling the jury not to worry because someone
else would correct their mistake if they voted to kill the defendant, seriously
undermined the accuracy of the jury deliberations, and therefore Caldwell
should be applied retroactively, even if it did announce a new rule.14
Notwithstanding the vigorous dissent by four justices, the merits of Sawyer's
petition for habeas relief was never ruled upon, since it failed to pass the
threshold requirement of retroactivity. Moreover, for the majority, it was
not such a watershed decision that went to the accuracy of the criminal
proceeding, and was therefore not retroactive on that ground either.
Thus, Sawyer's conviction and sentence of death were affirmed. Justice
Marshall summed up his view of this line of decisions when he concluded,
"the Court is less concerned with safeguarding constitutional rights than with
speeding defendants, deserving or not, to the executioner. I dissent." 47
It is ironic to note that, in a prior term of the Supreme Court, the Court
refused to overturn the death sentence of a defendant on Federal Habeas
Corpus review who raised a Caldwell type issue, on wholly different
grounds. In Dugger v. Adams, the petitioner, had failed to raise the Caldwell
issue in the Florida Supreme Court three years before Caldwell was decided
by the United States Supreme Court, but the Court did not deny relief
because Caldwell had enunciated a new rule, but rather because the issue was
not novel enough under existing Florida law to justify not raising the issue
in the first instance.'"
In Dugger, the trial judge had instructed the jury not to worry about
imposing the death sentence in a murder case because it was just a recom-
mendation to him, which he was free to disregard. The trial judge concluded
by telling the jury, "that's only my decision to make and it has to be on my
conscience. It cannot be on yours." 49 As in Sawyer, that statement was
contrary to state law. The Florida Supreme Court had held that a judge could
disregard a jury sentencing decision only "if the facts were 'so clear and
144. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 313).
145. Id. at 258. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (holding rules aimed at
deterring police conduct not to be retroactive, but holding those designed to promote the
accuracy of the criminal proceedings to be retroactive).
146. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 254-57.
147. Id. at 260.
148. Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401 (1989).
149. Id. at 403.
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convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.'" 1 °
The jury imposed the death sentence, which was affirmed by the Florida
Supreme Court in 1982, without the defendant having raised this issue."'
After Caldwell was decided in 1985, Dugger filed post conviction and federal
habeas corpus petitions, citing Caldwell.152 The Eleventh Circuit vacated
the death penalty,153 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari," and
reversed the Eleventh Circuit. 55
Justice White, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, found that
the claim was not "novel" enough under Florida law to excuse the failure
of the petitioner to raise the issue first on direct appeal to the Florida
Supreme Court, prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Caldwell."s  Since the Caldwell issue had not been raised in the first
instance, the petitioner was barred from applicatioft of the Caldwell rule due
to waiver and procedural default.157
The effect of these two decisions, considered together are reminiscent of
the fate of those who slept in the "Bed of Sodom." According to an ancient
Biblical folktale, visitors coming to an inn in the wicked Biblical city of
Sodom, were given a specially designed bed. If their legs were too long for
the bed, their legs were cut off. If their legs were too short for the bed, their
legs were stretched to fit. In either event, death and pain soon followed.
So, too, petitioners seeking to redress their grievances in the federal courts
now are caught in a virtual "Bed of Sodom." Barred by waiver, if the
principle of law first sought to be raised on collateral attack was known at
the time of conviction, or barred because its application would announce a
"new rule" if it was not known at the time of conviction, these defendants
are condemned to die, as their non-retroactive constitutional claims cry out
in vain for justice in the highest courts of the land.
VI. THE FLAUM APPROACH
In Taylor v. Gilmore,"5 8 the defendant was charged with the murder of
his wife's lover. 59 He admitted the killing, but maintained that he was
only guilty of manslaughter."w The jury received the Illinois Pattern
150. Id. at 403 (quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975)).
151. Dugger, 489 U.S. at 404.
152. Id. at 405.
153. Id. at 406 (citing Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526 (1lth Cir. 1986), modified on
denial of rehearing, 816 F.2d 1493 (1987)).
154. 485 U.S. 933 (1988).
155. Dugger, 489 U.S. at 406.
156. See id. at 408.
157. Id. at 410.
158. 954 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
159. Id. at 442.
160. Id.
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Instructions for both murder and manslaughter as well as verdict forms for
both crimes."' The jury returned a verdict of murder, instead of man-
slaughter.162 The conviction was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court,
and leave to appeal was denied by the Illinois Supreme Court."s Taylor
then filed a post-conviction petition, which was dismissed by the trial
court. " Thereafter, the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged in People
v. Reddick, that the Illinois Pattern Instructions for manslaughter, which were
used in Taylor's case, were faulty." Taylor appealed from the denial of
his post conviction petition, citing Reddick, but the Illinois Appellate Court
affirmed, holding that Reddick was decided on state grounds, and therefore
not a basis for post-conviction relief in Illinois.'6
Taylor then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal
district court, raising the same issue."' Eleven days later in Falconer v.
Lane," the Seventh Circuit decided that the Illinois Pattern instructions for
murder and manslaughter, when read together, violated due process as well
as state law."6 However, the federal district court denied Taylor's petition
on the grounds that both Reddick and Falconer had announced "new rules"
as defined by Teague v. Lane." Therefore, the district court denied
Taylor post-conviction relief under Teague. He appealed to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.
The case was assigned to a panel consisting of Judges Posner, Flaum,
and Manion." Judge Flaum began his analysis of whether or not the
decisions in Falconer and Reddick in fact enunciated "new rules" by first
characterizing the easy case for a "new rule," i.e., "any decision that
explicitly overrules a prior case, significantly departs from precedent, or
decides a question previously reserved. Conversely, a decision clearly does
not announce a new rule if it merely applies precedent, almost directly on
point, to a [closely] analogous set of facts.""n
However, Justice Flaum noted that determining whether a case extends
prior precedent or merely applies it in a somewhat different factual setting,
161. Id. at 444.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Reddick, 526 N.E.2d 141, 145-46 (Ill. 1988), cited in Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d at
444.
166. People v. Taylor, 536 N.E.2d 1312 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). Thereafter the Illinois Supreme
Court denied leave to appeal. Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d at 444.
167. Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d at 444.
168. 905 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1990).
169. Id. at 1136.
170. Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d at 445 (citing United States ex rel. Taylor v. Gilmore, 770
F. Supp. 445, 448 (C.D. II. 1990)).
171. Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d at 442.
172. Id. at 445 (citations omitted).
17
Hartman: To Be or Not to Be a "New Rule:" The Non-Retroactivity of Newly R
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1992
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
"is more an art than a science." 13 In order to aid in distinguishing "old
rules" from "new rules" in a close case, Judge Flaum suggested two criteria
for identifying a "new rule." The first criterion was whether any lower
courts, federal or state, had reached a contrary conclusion as to the precise
legal issue; if it had, then the rule was "new.""7 The second criterion was
the level of generality of its underlying precedent: the more general a
precedent was, the more likely it was that its progeny would announce a new
rule."7 Conversely, the more specific a precedent was, the less likely it
was that its progeny would announce a new rule.
As an example of the first criterion, Judge Flaum cited the controversy
over Roberson.176  The habeas petitioner in Butler" argued that
Roberson was dictated by Edwards,"' and therefore did not announce a
new rule. However, there had been a split in the federal circuits over this
issue (i.e. whether the Fifth Amendment prohibited further questioning by
police in a second unrelated charge after the defendant requested counsel on
the first charge) after Edwards came down, and until Roberson decided it.
That split indicated that the Roberson decision was not compelled by
precedent, and "hence that it announced a new rule.""
Judge Flaum also analyzed the holding that Roberson announced a new
rule, utilizing his second criterion. Under this analysis the rule of Edwards
was simply too general.'I In order to have compelled Roberson, Edwards
would have to have been more specific, e.g. it could have stated, "police
shall refrain from all further interrogation after a defendant asks for counsel,
whether or not the second interrogation involves the same crime than [sic]
the first."' Thus, according to Judge Flaum, the United States Supreme
Court in Butler viewed Roberson as a new rule because the general rule in
Edwards had a latent ambiguity, i.e. it did not specifically forbid subsequent
interrogation on matters unrelated to the first interrogation.1 2
VII. DID FALCONER ANNOUNCE A NEW RULE?
Having identified the criteria, Judge Flaum now set about to apply them
to the Falconer" situation to determine whether its holding should be
173. Id. at 445-46.
174. See id. at 446.
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 48, 53-66 and accompanying text (discussing Roberson).
177. See supra notes 45, 67-90 and accompanying text (discussing Butler).
178. See supra notes 47, 51-52 and accompanying text (discussing Edwards).
179. Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d at 446.
180. Id. at 447.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Falconer v. Lane, 905 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1990). See supra notes 168-69 and
accompanying text.
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given retrospective application to cases on collateral review. The decision
in that case was based upon a federal constitutional claim, and therefore
appropriate as grounds for federal habeas relief. In Falconer, the Seventh
Circuit had considered the same murder and manslaughter instructions used
in Taylor's trial.' The federal court determined that when read together,
the two sets of instructions could have left the jury "with the false impression
that it could convict the petitioner of murder even if she possessed one of the
mitigating states of mind described in the voluntary manslaughter instruc-
tion.""s  Therefore, the court held that this violated petitioner's due
process rights, and reversed Falconer's murder conviction. 86
Both the state and the defense agreed that based upon Falconer, the jury
instructions given in Taylor violated Taylor's due process rights. The State
argued however that Falconer announced a "new rule" since the decision
departed from previously expressed views of the Seventh Circuit itself on the
Illinois murder and voluntary manslaughter statutes.'87 If that were true,
Judge Flaum argued, then that would be the easy case, and Falconer would
indeed announce a new rule. However, after distinguishing two earlier
Seventh Circuit cases provided by the state, in which manslaughter
instructions were not given because the defendant below could not establish
the factual basis for the instructions, 88 Judge Flaum concluded that the
easy case could not be justified, and that Falconer did not clearly depart from
established precedent." Therefore, in order to resolve the question of
whether it announced a new rule, he was required to engage in the two part
analysis that he had suggested above for close cases.
The first part of the analysis related to whether any lower state or federal
court had previously disagreed with the ruling handed down in Falconer.
After reviewing the state's contentions, Judge Flaum concluded that there
were no cases that would indicate a split in authority."9 The only cases
cited by the state were cases in which the trial judge refused to tender
manslaughter instructions because the defendant failed to present sufficient
evidence to justify such an instruction,19" ' or cases which based their
decisions on state law, and not on the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment."9  Therefore, under the first criterion, Falconer did not
announce a new rule, and must be given retrospective application.
184. Taylor, 954 F.2d at 448, 450.
185. Falconer, 905 F.2d at 1136.
186. Taylor, 954 F.2d at 450 (discussing Falconer).
187. Id.
188. See Peery v. Sielaff, 615 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940 (1980);
and Bacon v. DeRobertis, 728 F.2d 874 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 840 (1984).
189. Taylor, 954 F.2d at 451.
190. Id. at 452.
191. Id. at 451; see Fleming v. Huch, 924 F.2d 679 (7th. Cir. 1991).
192. Id. at 452; see People v. Howard, 487 N.E.2d 656 (1985) and People v. McGee, 443
N.E.2d 1057 (1982).
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Regarding the second criterion (the level of generality of the case law
underlying the court's decision in Falconer), Judge Flaum concluded that the
case law preceding Falconer was specific enough to have compelled
Falconer's result, and therefore Falconer did not announce a new rule. 19
Judge Flaum began this analysis by breaking up the decision in Falconer into
two basic premises: the first was that the instructions were ambiguous and
susceptible to more than one interpretation,1" and the second was that a
murder verdict reached without the jury ever considering the defendant's
manslaughter defenses violated due process.19
With respect to the first premise, Judge Flaum began by citing Cupp v.
Naughton,"9 as authority for the proposition that a federal court may
overturn a state conviction if the "ailing" jury instructions "so infected the
trial that the resulting conviction violates due process."" 9 That holding
alone would have been too general to have compelled the result in Falconer.
However, Judge Flaum also considered Boyde v. California,1 which asked
whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury could have applied the
challenged instructions in an invalid manner. 1" Falconer, therefore, was
a reasonable application of the principles in Cupp and Boyde because it
impliedly held that there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the
Illinois murder and manslaughter instructions in an erroneous manner.'
Flaum conceded that Falconer was the first case to assert that these particular
instructions were ambiguous and susceptible to more than one interpretation,
but to hold Falconer as announcing a new rule for that reason "alone would
obliterate the distinction between rules and their applications, and thereby
contravene the principles of Teague."" With respect to the second
premise underlying Falconer, that instructions violate due process where they
permit a jury to reach a murder verdict without considering mitigating
evidence that might warrant a finding of voluntary manslaughter, Judge
Flaum cited Connecticut v. Johnson.' That case invalidated a murder
conviction because the instructions created an erroneous presumption on the
element of intent.' This led the jury to ignore exculpatory evidence.'
The fact that Johnson dealt with intent, an element of the crime, and
Falconer dealt with a mitigating mental state, which is an affirmative defense
193. Taylor, 954 F.2d at 453.
194. Id. at 452.
195. Id. at 453.
196. 414 U.S. 141 (1973).
197. Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F2d at 452 (quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 14647).
198. 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
199. Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d at 452-53.
200. Id. at 453.
201. Id.
202. 460 U.S. 73 (1983).
203. Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d at 453.
204. Id. (citing Johnson, 460 U.S. at 84-85).
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in Illinois, was held to be a distinction without a difference? 5 The key is
that similar to the effect of the instructions in Johnson, as a result of the
instructions in Falconer, the jury did not weigh evidence that may have led
to an acquittal of the charge for which the defendant was ultimately
convicted. The Supreme Court found a violation of due process in Johnson,
and Judge Flaum found that decision specific enough to have dictated the
result in Falconer.
Thus, with respect to both premises underlying the Falconer decision,
prior case decisions existed which were of a level of specificity sufficient to
have compelled the result in Falconer. This met the second criterion
suggested by Judge Flaum to determine whether a decision announced a new
rule.
Hence, under both criteria, the lack of a prior split in lower court
decisions before the holding of the Seventh Circuit in Falconer, and the
specificity of prior precedent by both the Seventh Circuit itself and the
United States Supreme Court, Falconer did not announce a new rule.
VIII. A TEST OF THE FLAUM THEORY-STRINGER V. BLACK
After Judge Flaum promulgated his suggested criteria for determining
whether a decision handed down a "new rule," the United States Supreme
Court decided the case of James Stringer.0
In June, 1982 Ray McWilliams and his wife Nell were shot and killed
in Jackson, Mississippi during an armed robbery of their home.' Reput-
edly, James Stringer planned and took part in the robbery and murder,
although he did not fire the fatal shots? Stringer dealt in gold and
jewels, as did the victim.? Knowing that McWilliams kept a lot of money
in his home, Stringer and several accomplices planned to go to his home,
lure him into opening his door by attempting to sell him jewelry, and then
cut his throat and that of his wife, since they would recognize the defen-
dant.21 0 McWilliams resisted, but he was shot by one of the defendant's
accomplices, and Mrs. McWilliams was shot in the head with a riot gun as
she attempted to crawl away. 211
Stringer received the death penalty after this jury was instructed inter
alia that one of the aggravating circumstances they could use in determining
whether or not to impose the death penalty was whether the capital murder
205. Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d at 453.
206. Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992).
207. Id. at 1134.
208. Id.
209. Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 471-72 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1230 (1985).
210. Id.
211. Id.
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was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.""' The Supreme Court of
Mississippi affirmed the conviction and sentence, and the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1985.213
Thereafter, in 1988 the United States Supreme Court decided tie case
of Maynard v. Cartwright 14 In Maynard, the Court vacated the death
penalty because that jury had been similarly instructed that if the crime
committed by the defendant was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel," a
valid aggravating factor existed upon which they could impose the death
penalty.2 15
In that case, the victims, the Riddles, were shot in their home by
Cartwright, a disgruntled ex-employee.216 Mr. Riddle died, while Mrs.
Riddle, who was also stabbed with a hunting knife, survived, and called the
police.217 At trial, the defendant was convicted of the first degree murder
of Mr. Riddle, and sentenced to death.2 18 The jury found two aggravating
factors to support their decision: first that the defendant had "'created a great
risk of death to more than one person,' second, that the murder was
'especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. '219 These factors, according to
the jury, outweighed the mitigating evidence, and justified the imposition of
the death penalty.'
After the case was affirmed on direct appeal by the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals,' and the defendant filed a habeas corpus petition in
federal court. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, en banc, reversed,
finding that the words, "heinous, atrocious, and cruel" were unconstitutional-
ly vague under the Eighth Amendment.' The court held that the words
did not offer sufficient guidance to the jury as required by Furman v. Geor-
gia.=
The Supreme Court granted certiorari' to resolve the conflict between
the state and federal courts, and upheld the ruling of the Tenth Circuit. The
unanimous decision of the Court, authored by Justice White, first differentiat-
ed between challenges of "vagueness" under the Due Process clause and such
212. Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. at 1134.
213. See Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d at 468.
214. 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
215. Id. at 359.
216. Id. at 358.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 359.
219. Id. (quoting Crimes and Punishment Code, OKIA. STAT. tit. 21 §§ 701.12(2) and (4)
(1981).
220. Id.
221. Cartwright v. State, 695 P.2d 548 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 911
(1985).
222. See Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1483-92 (10th Cir. 1987).
223. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 359-60 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972)).
224. 484 U.S. 1003 (1988).
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challenges under the Eighth Amendment. Under a Due Process analysis,
objections to vagueness rested on the lack of notice, and thus could be
overcome where the facts of the case gave reasonable notice that their
conduct was at risk.' But, under the Eighth Amendment, claims of
vagueness asserted that the aggravating circumstance challenged failed to
adequately inform the jury of the criteria necessary to impose the death
penalty, leaving them with the open ended discretion condemned in
Furman.' Justice White then found that the instruction void for vague-
ness under the Eighth Amendment.'
In deciding Cartwright, Justice White relied on Godfrey v. Georgia,
where the defendant had shot his wife and mother-in-law in the head with
one bullet each.'r Godfrey's death penalty sentence was reversed by the
United States Supreme Court where the single aggravating circumstance
found by the jury was that the killing was "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible and inhuman."' The Godfrey Court found that aggravating
circumstance so vague as to fail adequately to guide the jury, with the result
that arbitrary and capricious sentences of death could be imposed.'
Then, in Clemons v. Mississippi,"' the United States Supreme Court
also vacated the death penalty where a trial court had instructed the jury to
consider as an aggravating circumstance whether the murder was "especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel. " 2 In that case, Clemons and two others,
were accused of robbing and killing a pizza delivery man. Clemons
allegedly shot the victim because he had seen Clemons' face. 33 Clemons
later admitted the offense to his sister and her friend, and was convicted and
sentenced to death.' At the sentencing hearing, the state relied on two
aggravating factors, a) that the shooting was done in the course of a robbery,
and b) that the crime was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."' On
appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court noted that the second aggravating
factor was similar to the one invalidated for vagueness by the United States
225. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 361.
226. Id. at 362. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
227. Id. at 364.
228. 446 U.S. 420, 425 (1980).
229. Id. at 426.
230. Id. at 428-29.
231. 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
232. Id. at 742. The United States Supreme Court held that although the jury considered an
improper aggravating factor, the death sentence could have been valid if the state reviewing
court had properly reweighed the aggravating and mitigating factors, or conducted a proper
"harmless error" review. Id. at 748. However, because the Supreme Court could not be sure
that this process was conducted properly by the state reviewing court, it vacated the death
sentence. Id. at 754.
233. Id. at 741-42.
234. Id. at 74243.
235. Id. at 742.
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Supreme Court in Maynard v. Cartwright.' Unlike Oklahoma, however,
Mississippi had a procedure for salvaging death penalties when one
aggravating factor was invalid. The death penalty could stand under
Mississippi law, if the state supreme court found the other aggravating factor
sufficient to justify death 37 The Mississippi Supreme Court found that the
jury could have imposed the death penalty at issue without the other invalid
aggravating factor, and therefore affirmed the sentence of death."1 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 9 and reversed."'
Prior to the decision in Clemons, Stringer had filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi
alleging that the aggravating circumstance,"especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel" was void for vagueness" The District and Appellate Courts
denied relief, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the
case back to the Court of Appeals in the light of Clemons and Cart-
wright. 2 The Court of Appeals then held that these cases enunciated a
"new rule," and therefore relief to Stringer was barred by the retroactivity
doctrine of Teague. I"
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to Stringer again"
and reversed, holding that relief was not barred by Teague, since these cases
did not enunciate a new rule. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the
Court, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Blackmun,
Stevens, and O'Connor. Justice Souter dissented, joined by Justices Scalia
and Thomas. 5
Justice Kennedy began his analysis by stating that the result in Maynard
236. Id. at 743. See supra notes 215-231 and accompanying text.
237. Id. at 743-44.
238. Id. at 743. See Clemons v. State, 535 So. 2d 1354 (Miss. 1988).
239. 491 U.S. 904 (1989).
240. In the Supreme Court, Clemons argued that under Mississippi law, only a jury could give
the death penalty, and therefore only a jury could re-evaluate the case without the invalid
aggravating circumstance. Moreover, he argued, a reviewing court could not weigh the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances as a jury would. The United States Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice White, rejected that proposition, and held that appellate courts were
quite capable of engaging in such a weighing process. 494 U.S. at 745-46, 748-50. In this
particular case, however, the United States Supreme Court was not sure whether the Mississippi
Supreme Court had affirmed the sentence by simply relying on the "other" valid aggravating
factor, without doing a careful reweighing of the aggravation and mitigation. See id. at 751.
Another possibility was that the State Supreme Court considered the "heinous" factor
"narrowly," instead of disregarding it entirely. If the state court had construed the "heinous"
factor narrowly, which would have been consistent with Mississippi law, their harmless error
analysis would be faulty as well. Either course would be improper, so the United States Supreme
Court vacated the sentence of death, and remanded for further proceedings. See id. at 738.
241. See Stringer v. Scroggy, 675 F. Supp. 356, 366-67 (1987), aff'd 862 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir.
1988).
242. Stringer v. Black, 494 U.S. 1074, 1075 (1990).
243. Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. at 1135.
244. 111 S. Ct. 2009 (1991).
245. Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. at 1133.
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v. Cartwright was dictated by Godfrey.' Though the language in the two
cases was somewhat different, the principle of vagueness was the same. Both
phrases, "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman" and
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" were equally imprecise and offered
no real guidance to the sentencing jury.'
However, in deciding Stringer, Kennedy stated that even if a decision
did not state a new rule, that was not the end of the inquiry. One must ask
whether "granting the relief sought would create a new rule because the prior
decision is applied in a novel setting, thereby extending the precedent."'
Kennedy pointed out that the application of an old rule in a manner not
dictated by precedent could undermine the values of finality, predictability,
and comity just as easily as the application of a new rule. 9 The question
to be resolved then was whether the application of Godfrey, which arose out
of Georgia's procedure, would constitute a new rule if applied in Mississip-
250pi.
Although the State conceded that the application of Godfrey in Oklahoma
did not constitute a new rule and that Cartwright, which arose in Oklahoma,
was dictated by Godfrey, it argued that Clemons was not because the
methodologies employed by the juries in Georgia and Mississippi were
different."' In Mississippi, a "weighing state," the jury "weighed" all
aggravating factors against the mitigating factors, while, in Georgia, a "non-
weighing" state, once the jury found an aggravating factor, the decision to
impose death was based upon all the evidence in the case, (i.e. evidence
derived from the guilt-innocence phase as well as from the sentencing
phase). 2
Justice Kennedy, rejected the state's argument that applying Godfrey to
a "weighing state" constituted such a novel application of the decision so as
to announce a new rule.253 In a "weighing state," Kennedy noted, the jury
must consider the invalid factor in determining the sentence. In contrast, in
a "non-weighing" state, once the jury finds a valid aggravating factor, it is
less critical if there is also an invalid aggravating factor, because thereafter
the jury does not rely only on the other aggravating factors, but instead
reviews all the evidence in the case before it makes up its mind.'5
Therefore, the Mississippi Supreme Court should have realized that Godfrey,
arising out of a "non-weighing state," would be applicable, afortiori, to a
246. Id. at 1135-36.
247. Id.
248. Id. See Butler v. McKellar, 414 U.S., 407, 414-15 (1990).
249. Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. at 1135.
250. Id. at 1136.
251. See id.
252. Id. at 1136. Even though Oklahoma was a weighing state, there was no procedure in
Oklahoma to salvage a death penalty. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 743, 743 (1990).
253. Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. at 1136.
254. Id. at 1137.
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weighing state. Therefore, Clemons did not announce a new rule. 25
In dissent, Justice Souter noted first that in Georgia's Godfrey case, there
was only one aggravating circumstance submitted to the jury.' Once that
was determined to be invalid, there was no instruction to prevent the jury
from inflicting the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner .
7
But, to view this decision in Judge Flaum's terms, there was a latent
ambiguity in the decision. In other words, the question remained as to
whether Godfrey would also apply to a case where the jury had been
instructed on more than one aggravating factor, and where in addition to an
invalid factor, there were valid aggravating factors.
In his dissent, Justice Souter noted that the very next case decided by the
Supreme Court after Clemons answered that question in the negative. In
Zant v. Stephens, the Court upheld the death penalty where the jury had
received instructions on both valid and invalid aggravating factors." s In
that case the Court held that the instruction on the valid factor sufficiently
narrowed the class of those entitled to receive the death penalty.'
In addition, Souter cites Barclay v. Florida,' where the Court upheld
a death sentence in a weighing state imposed after the jury was instructed
with both valid and invalid aggravating instructions. Again, the Court's
theory was that the remaining valid instructions sufficiently narrowed the
field of those eligible to receive the death penalty, so as to satisfy the
requirements of Furman."'
Given those two cases, Souter poses the question, "whether it would
have been reasonable to believe in 1985 [the year Stringer's conviction
became final for Teague purposes] that a sentencer's weighing of a vague
aggravating circumstance does not offend the Eighth Amendment so long as
the sentencer has found at least one other aggravating circumstance."' -
Justice Souter concedes that the question of whether the Stephens decision
would apply to a weighing state was left open in Stephens, but after reading
Barclay, one could reasonably assume that it had been absolutely re-
solved.'
Looking at these cases in the light of Judge Flaum's "specificity"
criterion, (which looked to the level of generality in prior authority) the
decision by the majority in Stringer, that Clemons was dictated by Godfrey
and therefore did not lay down a new rule, is suspect. Was the decision in
255. See id. at 1140.
256. Id. at 1141.
257. Id.
258. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
259. See Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. at 1141-43 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Zant, 462 U.S.
at 878).
260. Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. at 1142 (citing Barclay v. Florida 463 U.S. 939 (1983)).
261. See Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. at 114445.
262. Id. at 1143-44 (footnotes omitted).
263. See id. at 1144.
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Godfrey clearly applicable to a weighing state where the jury was instructed
on a valid aggravating circumstance in addition to an invalid one ? The
answer is no! If one applies the analysis that Judge Flaum made with respect
to the latent ambiguity in Edwards, which resulted in the holding that
Roberson set forth a "new rule,"' to the Godfrey-Clemons situation, the
Court in Godfrey should have specified that its holding would apply in a
weighing state even if the jury were instructed on valid aggravating
circumstances as well as invalid ones. That would have avoided any possible
"latent ambiguities" in the Godfrey decision. In the absence of such
specificity, Judge Flaum's criterion requires that Stringer should have been
barred relief after Teague.
Moreover, even under Judge Flaum's "prior precedent" criterion, (which
ascertained whether a prior lower court decision had reached a contrary
result) at least four cases were cited in the majority and dissenting opinions
of the Supreme Court which would have led to the conclusion that Godfrey
was not binding in Mississippi. Justice Souter noted that in two prior cases,
the Fifth Circuit held that the rule in Stephens applied to a weighing
state.' In addition, Justice Kennedy conceded that in two other cases prior
to Clemons, the Fifth Circuit held that the Godfrey decision did not apply to
Mississippi.' Therefore, based upon both prongs of the Flaum analysis,
it must be acknowledged that the dissenters made a valid case for the
proposition that the result in Cartwright and Clemons may not have been
dictated by Godfrey, and that perhaps Stringer should have not received
retroactive relief.
IX. CRITIQUE AND CONCLUSION
Since neither of the criteria suggested by Judge Flaum and the Seventh
Circuit panel that decided Taylor are exact, Judge Flaum's statement that law
is an art, and not science, is most relevant when making decisions as to the
future scope of the "new rule" doctrine. Although his analysis of the criteria
which determine whether a decision constitutes a "new rule" is the clearest
which has emerged from the myriad of decisions on the topic, even his
criteria could not accurately predict the result in the next Supreme Court
case. Therefore, lower courts ought to proceed with great caution before they
deny habeas petitioners relief if their constitutional rights have been violated.
For example, with respect to Judge Flaum's first criterion, which looks
to see whether there has been a prior split in lower court decisions, Judge
264. See supra notes 181-183 and accompanying text.
265. Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. at 1145 (citing Stringer v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir.
1988), vacated, 494 U.S. 1074 (1990) and Edwards v. Scroggy, 849 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989).
266. See id. at 1140 (citing Evans v. Thigpen, 809 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1033 (1987); and Johnson v. Thigpen, 806 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 480
U.S. 951 (1987)).
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Flaum cautions that although his general argument was that a prior contrary
decision will result in a determination that the new "corrective" decision lays
down a "new rule," if the lower federal or state court decision which the
decision in question departs from, was blatantly wrong, then the new
"corrective" decision may not necessarily be a "new rule. "2
An example of this kind of reasoning is found in the United States
Supreme Court's discussion of Stringer.' If a justice wanted to hold that
Stringer should get retroactive relief, that justice could argue that the four
prior contrary lower court opinions (cited by Justice Souter in his dissent,
and acknowledged by Justice Kennedy in the majority opinion), were
blatantly wrong, and therefore the Clemons decision would not constitute, a
"new rule" for Mississippi. In fact, that is precisely what Justice Kennedy
did to minimize the impact of the cases cited by the State in opposition to his
position. He simply stated in his opinion, "[tihe short answer to the State's
argument is that the Fifth Circuit made a serious mistake in Evans v. Thigpen
and Johnson v. Thigpen.'
Conversely, Judge Flaum points out that a decision does not automatical-
ly hand down an "old rule" just because there are no prior contrary deci-
sions. The issue could still have been one that was in dispute, in which case
a decision resolving the dispute would still constitute a "new rule.'271
Secondly, let us critically examine his discussion of Roberson and
Edwards in the light of his second criterion, which looks to the level of
generality of prior precedent, and to whether prior decisions were specific
enough and sufficiently free of ambiguities so as to dictate the result in the
decision in question. He states that a latent ambiguity existed in Edwards as
to whether it applied to subsequent interrogations of unrelated offenses. 2
That may have been the opinion of the majority of the Supreme Court in
Butler, but the argument may also be made that there was no such ambiguity
in Edwards. In that event, Roberson would not have announced a "new
rule." After all, one could argue that although the facts in Edwards involved
but a single crime, the rationale of Edwards was applicable to multiple crime
suspects as well. The rationale of the majority of the Supreme Court Justices
in Edwards was that "an accused . . . having expressed his desire to deal
with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation
by the authorities until counsel has been made available. "2' It is submitted
that when the United States Supreme Court characterizes a custodial
defendant's affirmative response to his Miranda warnings, as "expressing his
267. Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d at 446.
268. See supra part VIII.
269. See supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text.
270. Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. at 1140.
271. Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d at 496.
272. Id. at 447.
273. 451 U.S. at 484.
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desire to deal with the police only through counsel;" it is arguable that the
police may not interrogate him thereafter on any crime without counsel
present. It stands to reason that if he did not want to deal with the police
without a lawyer with respect to the crime for which he has been arrested,
he would not now feel emboldened to want to deal with the police on some
other crime they are considering charging him with. If that were the
interpretation of Edwards, there would be no ambiguity on this issue, the
result in Roberson would be compelled by Edwards, and Roberson would not
announce a new rule. The subsequent decision in Minnick v. Mississippi 4
supports that more expansive interpretation of Edwards. In that case the
Supreme Court held that the protection of Edwards did not cease when the
suspect had merely conferred with counsel, but that the presence of counsel
was required before questioning could take place.
Just as one could argue persuasively, using Judge Flaum's criteria, that
Roberson did not lay down a new rule, one could also argue that Clemons v.
Mississippi was not dictated by Godfrey v. Georgia, and therefore announced
a new rule, even though the instructions in the two cases were almost
identical, and a majority of the Supreme Court found that Clemons did not
announce a new rule.
Judge Flaum's two criteria are very helpful for analyzing whether
a given United States Supreme Court or federal court decision is to be given
retrospective application on collateral review. They are logical and in line
with the finest critical thinking in this field. But the Supreme Court's
decisions on this issue have seemingly applied shifting criteria, so that Judge
Flaum's analysis cannot yet be regarded as a reliable predictor of whether a
case will be characterized as announcing a "new rule" or not.
The confusion that has characterized the decisions of state and federal
courts as to what is and is not determined to be a "new rule," becomes
especially critical in death penalty cases. Denial of habeas relief in these
cases on the grounds that a specific decision of the United States Supreme
Court is a "new rule" has implications of major magnitude.
Consider again what the American public would think of the medical
profession if a person diagnosed as having a fatal disease were to be denied
a new cure for his terminal illness just because under existing medical
guidelines, the patient may only be treated by medicine and procedures
available to him at the date of diagnosis. Yet, that is the import of the legal
decisions on the non-retroactivity of "new rules." The prisoner is to be
accorded only those constitutional guarantees existing at the time of his
conviction.
The proposition that a habeas petitioner on death row would be denied
retrospective application of a decision by a federal court which had found a
law or procedure used in his case violative of the Constitution, "shocks the
conscience" in much the same way. Add to that, the uncertainty generated
274. 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
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by the lack of clarity as to what constitutes a "new rule," and the suggestion
made by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Saffle v. Parks, 5 takes on new
meaning. Justice Brennan argued that capital sentencing errors should fall
under the second Teague exception for "watershed rules of criminal
procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal
proceeding."276 Therefore, the "new rule" doctrine would simply not
apply in cases where constitutional violations were found in the sentencing
process, which resulted in the imposition of the death penalty. If this were
the case, there can be no compelling justification for allowing the "new rule"
jurisprudence to govern the guilt-innocence phase of a capital trial either.
First of all, this phase is often inextricably interwoven with the sentencing
phase, and constitutional errors during the adjudicatory phase which result
in the imposition of death should not be tolerated in a society whose
Constitution, reinterpreted or not, is the governing law of the land.
To the extent that Judge Flaum's insightful and careful analysis will
attempt to put some order into the decision making process by which some
rules will be declared' "new" and others compelled by prior precedent, the
Taylor decision is an important contribution to the field of federal habeas
corpus. But, as Justice Scalia recently acknowledged concerning another
issue in Harmelin v. Michigan, "death is different."2' Therefore capital
cases should be exempted from this "new rule" analysis, and should not be
sacrificed upon the altar of the god of finality for finality's sake. The
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"
demand no less."8
275. 494 U.S. 484, 506 (1990). See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
276. Id. at 505. See also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990); Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d
448 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 510-(1992) (applying the "bedrock procedural"
exception of Teague to the question of requiring unanimity of jury with respect to mitigating
evidence in a capital case.)
277. 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2682 (1991).
278. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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